Cornell Law Review
Volume 54
Issue 1 November 1968

Article 1

Role of the Supreme Court in a Democratic
Society -Judicial Activism or Restraint
J. Skelly Wright

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
J. Skelly Wright, Role of the Supreme Court in a Democratic Society -Judicial Activism or Restraint, 54 Cornell L. Rev. 1 (1968)
Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr/vol54/iss1/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Cornell Law Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more information, please
contact jmp8@cornell.edu.

CO3 R NELL
LA
FlEVI E
Volume 54

November 1968

Number I

THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN A
DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY-JUDICIAL
ACTIVISM OR RESTRAINT?
J. Skelly Wright t
One of the Warren Court's severest critics tells us that during the
Chief Justice's tenure the Supreme Court has "wrought more fundamental changes in the political and legal structure of the United States
than during any similar span of time since the Marshall Court had the
unique opportunity to express itself on a [clean slate]. " 1 This has dis-

tressed those who counsel judicial restraint.
Remembering that certain past Supreme Courts, particularly
those of the twenties and early thirties, also tried to play an active role
in shaping our society, the apostles of restraint warn that even though
we may approve the results that the Warren Court has decreed, we still
must chastise the Court for assuming an activist role. 2 For even if the
changes are desirable, they say the Court is not the proper institution
to initiate them. Rather, the sorts of judgments the Court has made
are the province of the legislatures; and, of course, the Court must not
legislate. After all, it was the illicit role of a super legislature that the
Nine Old Men are said to have assumed.
These critics are particularly upset because, just as many of the illfated "activist" decisions of the past were decided by recourse to the
open-ended concept of substantive due process,8 so many of the Warren
t Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
I Kurland, The Supreme Court 1963 Term, Foreword: Equal in Origin and Equal
in Title to the Legislative and Executive Branches of Government, 78 HAmv. L. Rav. 143

(1964).

2 See, eg., Freund, New Vistas in ConstitutionalLaw, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 691 (1964);
Freund, The Supreme Court Under Attack, 25 U. PTTr. L. Ray. 1 (1963).
S See, e.g., Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923); Coppage v. Kansas, 236
U.S. 1 (1915); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908); Lochner v. New York, 198 'US.
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Court's path-breaking decisions have been rendered pursuant to the
equally open-ended concepts of equal protection and procedural due
process. 4 It is into these generalized constitutional commands that the
Justices are most likely to read their own personal predilections and
thus render ad hoc justice. Consequently, both the old Court and the
Warren Court are criticized for much the same reasons.
There is, however, an obvious difference between the two Courts.
The Nine Old Men were trying to halt a revolution in the role of government as a social instrument, 5 while the Warren Court is obviously
furthering that effort. Its most significant pronouncements have decreed change in the status quo, not its preservation. 6 Rather than invalidate legislative efforts at social progress, its decisions have ordered
alteration of widespread and long accepted practices, including many
which had not been legislatively sanctioned in the first place. In Professor Berle's phrase, the Warren Court has functioned as a "revolutionary committee."
45 (1905). For a discussion of the Court's retreat from this area, see McCloskey, Economic
Due Process and the Supreme Court: An Exhumation and A Reburial, 1962 Sup. CT. REv.
34, 36-45.
4 See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd.of Elec., 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Reynolds v. Sims, 377
U.S. 533 (1964); Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163 (1964); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S.
353 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483
(1954). See also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478
(1964); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), all of which, though couched in terms
of fifth and six amendment guarantees, have strong equal protection overtones. See
Kamisar, Equal Justice in the Gatehouses and Mansions of American Criminal Procedure,
in Y. KAMI a, F. INBAU & T. ARNoLD, CIMINA. JusTIcE IN OUR TIMES 69 (A. Howard ed.
1965).
5 Surely one of the hallmarks of the old Court was the frequency with which it
struck down recently enacted legislation, both state and federal. Hammer v. Dagenhart,
247 U.S. 251 (1918), struck down the Child Labor Act which had been passed in 1916.
Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20 (1922), invalidated the Child Labor Tax Act,
passed only three years before in a legislative effort to circumvent the results of Dagenhart. In Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935), the Court scuttled
the National Industrial Recovery Act, passed only two years before, and in Carter v.
Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936), the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935,
enacted the previous year, met a similar fate. The Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933,
was almost as short-lived when it was killed by United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
Furthermore, while the Court was busy saving the states from a federal government which
it felt was acting beyond its constitutional powers, it also attempted to save the states
from themselves. In Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936), for instance, the Court, following its illustrious predecessors that had decided Lochner v. New
York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), and Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923), struck
down New York's 1933 minimum wage law for women as violative of substantive due
process.
6 See cases cited note 4 supra. See also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965);
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Abington School Dist. v. Schempp,
374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
7 A. BEru.E, THE THREE FAcEs or PowER vii (1967).
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Simply to say, however, that the Warren Court has frequently ordered change while the old Court tried to halt it does not itself establish that the one has done a good job and the other a bad one. Nor does
it establish that either Court should have acted at all. It is my contention that the Warren Court has not simply decreed the right results,
but also that it was right to have decreed them. Its active role in shaping our society has been a necessary and proper one. It is, then, necessary to distinguish its performance from that of certain "activist"
Courts of the past whose performances were certainly injudicious. In
order to do this, the sort of arguments that are made to support the
doctrine of judicial restraint will be examined briefly, and both their
validity and their bearing on an assessment of the work of the Warren
Court must be considered.
I
THE ARGUMENTS FOR RESTRAINT

Three types of arguments are made against the courts playing an
active role in shaping our society. One stresses the illegitimacy of the
courts so acting, another emphasizes the adverse effects on democratic
processes when the court so acts, while the third denies the ability of
the courts to do it well. The last argument will be considered first.
A. Limitations of Institutional Competency
The stress here is not on the illegitimacy of the Court's behaving
like a legislature, but on its incapacity to do so effectively. To begin
with, we are told that the Court cannot act until a case is brought to it,
and that anything said in the course of the opinion that is not crucial
to the decision itself is mere dictum and without the force of law.
Moreover, the judgment in a particular case binds only the parties.
Consequently, the Court can never confront a broad social issue or
solve it in a comprehensive fashion.8 In addition, the Court does not
have the requisite fact-finding machinery and therefore cannot acquire
the pertinent knowledge upon which intelligent social action must be
based.9
Moreover, judicial review is a blunt instrument. The Court cannot make the subtle, delicate, and in a sense arbitrary, distinctions and
discriminations which the legislature can, and frequently must, make.
8 See Mr. Justice Holmes' statement on this point in Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244
U.S. 205, 221 (1917).
9 See Alfange, The Relevance of Legislative Facts in Constitutional LaW, 114 U. PA.

L. Rav. 637 (1966).
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If, for instance, the 'Court had held discrimination in public accommodations to be unconstitutional, it could not very well have exempted,
as the Civil Rights Act of 1964 does, owner-occupied rooming houses
with fewer than five boarders. 10 Furthermore, it could never have undertaken the temporal and geographical line-drawing that characterizes
the Voting Rights Act of 1965.11 Similarly, it was long believed that the
Court could not decree that its constitutional judgment, like most
legislation, be given only prospective effect. Most important of all,
perhaps, is the fact that the Court, having the power neither of the
purse nor the sword, must rely on the legislative and executive branches
of government to enforce its directives.' 2
These considerations are, of course, very persuasive arguments
for judicial restraint. We have seen the consequences of their disregard. For instance, without any fact-finding machinery whatever, the
old Court in Lochner v. New York felt confident in surmising that
there was "no reasonable foundation for holding [a state statute limiting the hours of work for bakers to sixty hours a week] to be necessary
or appropriate as a health law to safeguard the public health or the
health of the individuals who are following the trade of a baker."' 3
Indeed, virtually all the old economic due process cases holding federal
and state statutes unconstitutional resulted, at least in part, from the
Court's fact-finding incapacity.
Moreover, these considerations of institutional incapacity may apply with particular force where the Court is itself decreeing broad
changes in the status quo, For the Court not only faces its usual factgathering disabilities involved in making its initial judgment; it must
also be prepared to oversee and administer the operation of the decree
itself. And the Court's affirmative mandate may require the state to expend money which the legislature is unwilling to appropriate. 14
In certain areas the Court has tried to surmount these obstacles.
It has, for instance, tried to inform itself more fully by requesting
amicus briefs and, on occasion, such as in the second Brown v. Board
of Education case,'3 it has invited the Attorney General to file a brief
1o

42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b)(1) (1964).
11 42 U.S,C. § 1973 (Supp, I 1965).
12 See Deutsch, Neutrality, Legitimacy, and the Supreme Court, Some Intersections
Between Law and Political Science, 20 STAN. L. Rav. 169, 186 (1968).
13 198 U.S. 45, 58 (1905) (emphasis added).
14 See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12
(1956). See also State v. Rush, 46 N.J. 399, 217 A.2d 441 (1966).
15 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
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even though the United States was not a party to the case. 16 It has also

limited several of its constitutional decisions in the criminal law area
to prospective effect only.'7 In Miranda v. Arizona s it tried to deal
with an issue at wholesale by establishing a veritable constitutional
code of police procedure. And it has delegated the administrative responsibility for enforcing Brown and the reapportionment cases to the
lower federal courts.' 9 These courts have in turn looked to experts for
guidance. The Fifth Circuit in the Jefferson County school integration
case, for instance, judicially adopted the HEW desegregation guidelines,20
Interestingly, many of the critics who point out that the Court is
not institutionally competent to make "legislative" determinations become even less sanguine when the Court tries to overcome its institutional limitations. The critics, however, cannot have it both wayscriticizing the Court for making legislative judgments in the guise of
adjudication because it cannot legislate wisely, then becoming even
more scornful when the Court legislates more candidly in order to do
so more effectively. 21
But whatever one may think of the Court's attempts to mitigate
the effects of its institutional incapacities, what is clear about these incapacities is that, where relevant, they counsel deference to the legis16 The Court also invited the Attorneys General of all states requiting or permitting
racial discrimination in public education to present their views on the question of relief.
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495-96 (1954).
17 Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S, 293 (1967); Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S, 719 (1966);
Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406 (1966); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S.
618 (1965).
I8 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
19 Bluntly, litigation in these fields has reached the point where, in many cases,
the Supreme Court lays down the principle but sends the case itself back to a
district or a state court with instruction to draw an appropriate decree ....
A. BEmRE, supra note 7, at 53.
20 United States v. Jefferson Co. Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836 (5th Cir. 1966). See N.Y.
Times, Mar. 11, 1967, at 24, col. 2.
21 The point is somewhat analogous to one made in a recent article by Professor
Deutsch:
If the difficulty with entrusting political decisions to the Court is its political
unresponsiveness, ought we not welcome a "greater sensitivity to . . . shifts in
the political temper?" If, on the other hand, we distrust decisions based on
transitory shifts in the electorate's mood, is not the solution precisely an institution "unresponsive to the democratic process?" What we cannot do-once we agree
that judicial review involves a duty to render decisions that necessarily entail
political consequences-is to have it both ways, simultaneously denying legitimacy
to decisions of a politically unresponsive institution and to decisions of one that
responds to shifts in political sentiment.
Deutsch, supra note 12, at 187.
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lature but do not require it. Where the choice is between the Court
struggling alone with a social issue and the legislature dealing with it
expertly, legislative action is to be preferred. All too often, however,
the practical choice has been between the Court doing the job as best
it can and no one doing it at all. 22 Faced with these alternatives, the
Court must assume the legislature's responsibility. If the legislature
simply cannot or does not act to correct an unconstitutional status quo,
the Court, despite all its incapacities, must finally act to do so. For "nature abhors a political vacuum as much as any other kind,"' 3 and if the
legislatures do not live up to their constitutional responsibilities, the
Court must act to fill the vacuum.
B. Adverse Effects on Popular Responsibility
An altogether different argument for judicial restraint is based on
the presumed tendency of judicial review to weaken the democratic
processes. Here the emphasis is not on the ineffectiveness of judicial
action, but on the debilitating side effects such action is likely to have
on the other branches of government. For if the Court steps in to correct the constitutional errors of the legislative and the executive
branches of government, those institutions will come to rely on it
to do so and will cease to discharge their own responsibilities to remain within the boundaries of the Constitution.
James Bradley Thayer laid the keystone for this argument over
sixty-five years ago:
[L]egislatures are growing accustomed to this [judicial] distrust and more and more readily inclined to justify it, and to
shed the considerations of constitutional restraints . . . turning
that subject over to the courts .... The people, all this while, become careless as to whom they send to the legislature . . . [and

come to depend on] these few wiser gentlemen on the bench...
to protect them against their more immediate representatives ....
[T]he [consequent exercise of the power of judicial review], even
when unavoidable, is always attended with a serious evil, namely,
that the correction of legislative mistakes comes from the outside,
It is regrettable, of course, that in deciding this case this court must act in an
area so alien to its expertise. It would be far better indeed for these great social
and political problems to be resolved in the political arena by other branches of
government. But these are social and political problems which seem at times to
defy such resolution. In such situations, under our system, the judiciary must
bear a hand and accept its responsibility to assist in the solution where constitutional rights hang in the balance.
22

Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 517 (D.D.C. 1967). See also Cox, The Supreme
Court 1965 Term, Foreword: Constitutional Adjudication and the Promotion of Human
Rights, 80 HA. v. L. R y. 91, 122 (1966).
23 D. BROGAN, THE CRISES OF AMuwqC
FanA
nLusm 43 (1944).
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and the people thus lose the political experience, and the moral
education and stimulus that comes from fighting the question out
in the ordinary way, and correcting their own errors. The tendency
. is to dwarf the political capacity of the people, and to deaden
24
its sense of moral responsibility.
Despite the insight of Thayer's observation, in the last analysis his
advice is mistaken. When the Court is asked to review a statute it can
do one of three things: find it constitutional, find it unconstitutional,
or, one way or another, avoid dealing with the constitutional question
altogether. Leaving aside the last possibility, Thayer seems to say that,
except in a compelling case 2 5 the Court should uphold the statute's
constitutionality and hope for its repeal by a more enlightened legislature.
As Professor Black has perceptively observed, however, when the
Court upholds a statute's constitutionality it "legitimates" it. 26 When a
statute expresses the most enlightened sentiments of the community,
this legitimating function may serve the important and creative purpose of adding impetus and dignity to measures hesitantly enacted.
But unfortunately the Court's seal of constitutional approval has the
same effect where the statute is a repressive one. When the Court validates such a statute, it adds moral fuel to the political fire and makes a
legislative repeal even less likely. Of course lawyers know that, theoretically at least, the Court's finding a statute constitutional implies
nothing about its wisdom. Nevertheless, until the Supreme Court validates it, the opposition's argument that it is unconstitutional, or simply
unwise, may induce the majority to take a second look. Once the Supreme Court warrants the statute, the opposition is undercut.
It is perhaps instructive to notice that even where the Court has
expressed moral disapproval of a statute, while upholding its constitutionality, the legislature has often vigorously asserted its acknowledged
prerogative and has paid scant attention to the Court's attempt at moral
suasion. For instance, after the Court reluctantly upheld the compulsory flag salute rule in Minersville School Districtv. Gobitis,27 the West
24 J. THAYER, JOHN MARSHALL 103-04, 106-07 (1901), as discussed in A. BlICKEL, THE
LEAsr DANGEROUS BRAN cH 21-22 (1962).
25 "[The Court] can only disregard the Act when those who have the right to make

laws have not merely made a mistake, but have made a very clear one,--so clear that it
is not open to rational question." Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine

of Constitutional Law, 7 HAmv. L. REv. 129, 144 (1893). Few such compelling cases exist.
For an analysis of Thayer's rule of the "clear mistake," see A. BicKa., supra note 24, at
35-46.
26 C. BLACK, THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT 34-86 (1960).
27 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
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Virginia legislature enacted a comparable statute for the state as a whole,
and other states quickly joined the repressive band wagon. Finally the
Court was forced to reverse this trend by reversing itself and overruling
Gobitis three years later in West Virginia State Board of Education v.
2
Barnette. 8
Although Thayer did not stress the alternative of avoidance, Professor Bickel has suggested, not that the Court validate such unconstitutional statutes, but that, in part for the reasons Thayer canvassed, it
stay its hand and avoid a constitutional determination altogether. 29 By
avoiding decision on the constitutional merits, the Court gives the representative branches a chance to correct their own constitutional mistakes. Of course, when the Court avoids review and thus denies the
claim of a valid constitutional right, the moving party's right goes unvindicated. But perhaps Professor Bickel is right to the extent that
where the moving party's claims, although perhaps valid, are less than
overpowering, avoidance by the Supreme Court is the lesser of two
evils.80
Furthermore, Bickel's advice may be particularly meaningful when
the Court contemplates the recognition of a constitutional duty rather
than the invalidation of a particular statute. To begin with, whether
such a duty has come to exist in our society-whether, in other words,
the status quo is now unconstitutional-may be a judgment more difficult to make than declaring a specific statute unconstitutional. In addition, it would be a very serious matter for the people to come to rely
on the Court as the most important force for change in our society.
That the legislature might come to enact laws without adequately considering their constitutionality, leaving it to the Court to correct its
mistakes, would be very unfortunate; but if the people and the legislatures were to come to expect the Court to do their work for them, it
319 U.S. 624 (1943).
A. Blcs.E, supra note 24, at 69-72, 110-98. See Bickel, The Supreme Court 1960
Term, Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REv. 40 (1961).
30 [Ihe equities on the side of the moving patty will Vary il intensity. .. This
is not an argument relevant to the issue of principle itself. It can only make more
palatable the use of a device of avoidance that works against the moving party.
*.. There are crucial differences... between the role 6f the Supreme Court in
constitutional cases and the function of courts of general jurisdiction. The latter
sit as primary agencies for the peaceful settlement of disputes. . . . They must,
indeed, resolve all controversies within their jurisdiction, because the alternative
is chaos. [By contrast, the Supreme Court's] interventions are ... exceptional and
limited, and they occur, not to forestall chaos, but to revise a pre-existing order
that is otherwise viable and was itself afrived at by mote normal processes. Fixation on an individual right to judgment by the Supreme Court is, therefore ....
question-begging.
A. BICKEL, supra note 24, at 173.
28
29
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would be far worse. Finally, as previously mentioned, the Court may
be institutionally ill-equipped to decree and oversee substantial social
reform.
In the last analysis, however, these considerations again simply require that the Court not act precipitately. If substantial rights are at
stake which the legislative process cannot or will not vindicate, the
task of doing so unfortunately, but inevitably, passes to the courts. It is
this task which the Warren Court has reluctantly, but properly, assumed with respect to the implementation of our constitutional ideal
of equality.
C. The Court as an Undemocratic Institution
A final argument for judicial restraint goes neither to the Court's
efficiency nor to the effect of judicial review on other branches of government, but rather to the Court's legitimacy as a policy maker in a
democratic society. Here the Court's required self-restraint is said to
follow from its undemocratic structure. The syllogism goes something
like this: Ours is an essentially democratic society. The Supreme Court,
in its reviewing capacity, is an undemocratic, "inherently oligarchic," 31
and "deviant institution in the American democracy, '3 2 Therefore, except in the most compelling situations, it should allow the representa38
tive bodies to act, or not act, as they choose.
There are at least two things that should be said About this argument. First, both of its premises are shaky. It is, to begin with, unclear
just what is meant by a "democratic society." Perhaps we can agree on
this familiar definition:
[A] democratic political system is one in which public policies are
made, on a majority basis, by representatives subject to effective
popular control at periodic elections which are conducted on the
principle of political equality and under conditions of political
freedom. 34
31 See AFL v. American Sash & Door Co., 335 U.S. 538, 555 (1949) (Frankfurter, J.,

concurring).
32 A. BicrEL, supra note 24, at 18.
33 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 555-56 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
See generally A. BIcKErL, supra note 24, at ch. 1. But see id. at 258 (contradicting ch. 1);
L. HAND, The Contributionof an Independent Judiciary to Civilization, in THE SPIR OF
LBERTY 172 (1952); Choper, On the Warren Court and Judicial Review, 17 CAmI. U.L.
REv. 20, 36-41 (1967); McCleskey, JudicialReview in a Democracy: A Dissenting Opinion,
3 HousT. L. REv. 354 (1962). Contra, C. BLACK, supra note 26, at 155-222; E. RosTow, THE
SOVEREIGN PRER OGATrvE: THE SUPRENIE COURT AND THE QUEST FOR LAw 118-21 (1962); Beth,
The Case for Judicial Protection of Civil iberties, 17 J. POL. 100 (1955); Mason, The
Supreme Court: Temple and Forum, 48 YALEREv. 524 (1959); Rostow, The Democratic
Charter of Judicial Review, 6& HALv, L. REv. 193 (1952).
34 H. MAYO, AN INTRODUCTION To DEmOcRATic TEORY 70 (1960).
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Although under this definition the Court is certainly not a democratic institution-staffed as it is by men with lifetime appointments
and "hedged about by an unusually intricate impeachment process and
an absolute guaranty against diminution of compensation" 5-it is
equally clear that many of our other governmental institutions are also
undemocratic. To the extent the definition suggests that policy making
should be responsive to majority will, the Senate itself could not
qualify, for its composition, whereby the votes of 18,000,000 Californians count no more than those of 180,000 Alaskans, can hardly be said
to be conducive to majority rule. And the House, at least before its districts were ordered apportioned by population in Wesberry v. Sanders,36
was not truly representative either.
Moreover, the internal rules of the legislatures make popular-that is to say majority--control even less likely. The enormous power
of the committee chairman stems from seniority which is often more
the product of the disenfranchisement of the opposition than of ability
or even popularity. Or, to take an even more extreme example of minority leverage, consider the Senate's rules of debate. Under these
rules, a filibuster can be broken only if two-thirds of the Senate votes to
close off debate. And if cloture is not voted, the debated bill will almost
certainly not be enacted. Consequently thirty-four Senators representing fewer than 15,000,000 people can kill legislation that may be desired
37
by an overwhelming majority.
These are just a few of the anti-majoritarian features of our most
representative bodies. In addition, consider the heads of the administrative agencies who wield tremendous power and are not directly responsible to any electorate. 38 Finally, and most important of all, a thoroughgoing majoritarianism is inconsistent with the very idea of limited
-that is to say constitutional--government. For the Constitution itself sets out certain areas as simply beyond the reach of the present
majority.3 9 Is the Constitution itself then a deviant document in our
democracy?
35 McGowan, The Supreme Court in the American Constitutional System, The
Problem in HistoricalPerspective, 33 NOTRE DAME LAW. 527, 539 (1958).
86 376,U.S. 1 (1964).
37 See -M. SHAPiRO, FREEDoM OF SPEECH: THE SUPREME COURT AND JUDICIAL REVIEW
17-34 (1966); Deutsch, supra note 12, at 185-86.
38 See C. BLAcK, supra note 26, at 179-80; E. RosTow, supra note 33, at 152.
39 The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from
the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of
majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by
the courts. One's right to life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a free press,
freedom of worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be
submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections.
West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).
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This argument for judicial restraint not only overplays the Court's
deviancy but also overstresses its immunity from democratic processes.
To begin with, the Justices are appointed by the President, the one
elected official whose constituency is the nation as a whole. On the average a new appointment is made every twenty-two months4 0 And, as
Justice Frankfurter reminds us, "Judges are men, not disembodied
spirits" 41 who are blind to the political reality around them. Moreover,
if the Justices are not themselves sufficiently attuned to the times, Congress can bring reality home to them through its power over the
Court's appellate jurisdiction. Indeed, if the Court is too far out of
touch with the people, the Congress and the executive can annul its
directives simply by refusing to execute them, or the people can do so
by constitutional amendment. In sum, although the Court is not politically responsible, it is likely to be politically responsive. 42
Even more important, however, is the fact that the legitimacy of
a particular institution in our society depends not on its intrinsic representational structure, but rather on its institutional authorization
from, and acceptance by, the community. As Dean Rostow has said,
whatever the intention of the Framers, judicial review
...has been exercised by the Court from the beginning ....And
it stands now... as an integral feature of the living constitution,
long since established as a working part of the democratic political
life of the nation 4 3
The weight of. .. history is evidence that the people do expect the
courts to interpret, declare, adapt and apply these constitutional
provisions, as one of their main protections against the possibility
of abuse by Presidents and legislatures. 44
No conclusions can be drawn as to whether the Court should play
a vigorous or a subdued role simply because its judgments may not reflect majority will. No one has ever suggested that the Senate should
act cautiously for similar reasons, or even that it should defer to its
more representative co-chamber, the House. Although the undemocratic, nonrepresentative structure of the Court is not informative as to
how the Court should play its role within its proper province, it does
tell us something about the limits of the province itself. It is this province that requires definition.
40 See Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National
Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279, 284-86 (1957).
41 Frankfurter, Some Observations on the Nature of the Judicial Process of Supreme
Court Litigation, 98 PROc. AMER. PHIL. Soc. 233, 237 (1954).
42 See A. BIcKEL, supra note 24, at 16-19; Deutsch, supra note 12, at 169, 186.
43 Rostow, The Supreme Court and the People's Will, 33 NomE DAME LAw. 573,
576 (1958).
44 Id. at 590.
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II
JUDICIAL REVIEW IN A DEMoCRAcy

Despite what has just been said, there can of course be no doubt
that ours is essentially a society where the exercise of power draws its
legitimacy from the consent of the people. 45 Moreover, the sort of society we are going to have is to be determined by the people. Our faith is
not simply in our ability to choose wise rulers, but in our ability to
rule ourselves wisely. Learned Hand was not alone when he said that
he would find it irksome to be ruled by a bevy of platonic guardians
46
even if he knew how to choose them.
The Court, then, is not to function as a nine-man bevy, reviewing
legislation from the same, but presumably more enlightened, perspective as the legislature. When the majority, speaking through the legislature, has decided that the legislation is desirable, it is not for the
Court to strike it down simply because it thinks otherwise. Yet whenever the Court strikes down legislation, it says to the majority that it
may not have its own way. If the Court is to refrain from doing this
simply because the Justices find the status quo preferable, when and on
what basis is it to strike down legislation? What are the Court's institutional characteristics that enable it to bring to the appraisal of legislation a new and different perspective unavailable to the legislature?
How can the Court presume to say to the present majority that it cannot have its own way because its wishes are contrary to its own fundamental principles?
But just as an individual may be untrue to himself, so may society
be untrue to itself. The Court's reviewing function, then, can be seen
as an attempt to keep the community true to its own fundamental
principles. Maintaining these "enduring general values" of the community is a task for which the Court's structure makes it peculiarly
well suited. Professor Bickel suggests that judges have, or should have,
the leisure, the training, and the insulation to follow the ways of the
scholar in pursuing the ends of government. This is crucial to sorting
out the enduring values of a society. And it is not something that institutions can do well on occasion, while operating for the most part
47
with a different set of gears.
Moreover, in considering questions of principle, courts are pre,
sented with the reality of their application. Statutes deal typically with
45 A. BicwEL, supra note 24, at 29-30.
46 L. HAND, THE BiLL OF R GHTS 73-74
47 A. BICKEL, supra note 24, at 25-26.
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abstract or sometimes dimly foreseen problems, Coturts are concerned
with the flesh and blood of an actual case. This tends to modify, perhaps to lengthen, everyone's view. It also provides an extremely salutary proving ground for all abstradtions; it is conducive, in a phrase of
Holmes, to thinking things, not words, and thus to the evolution of
principle by a process that tests as it creates.48 "Their insulation and
the marvelous mystery of time give courts the capacity to appeal to
men's better natures, to call forth their aspirations, which may have
been forgotten in the moment's hue and cry? '49 This is what Justice
Stone called the opportunity for "the sober second thought." 0 Charles
Black put it more concisely when he termed judicial review "the people's institutionalized means of self-control."1
This conception of judicial review, casting the Court as the guardian of enduring principle and as a check on overzealous legislatures,
depicts the Court as an essentially conservative rather than creative
force in our society-hardly the "revolutionary committee" Professor
Berle has called the Warren Court. 2 The political and social realities
of the twentieth century, however, have required government to essay
an affirmative role in its service to its citizens. The Court, as part of
government, must participate in that affirma-Vive role.
This, of course, does not minimize the importance of protecting
fundamental individual rights from governmental invasion. The original Bill of Rights was essentially negative, putting beyond the reach of
government the world of the spirit and raising procedural barriers to
governmental intrusion. The definition of these barriers in opinions
such as Brandeis's dissent in Olmstead&3 or his concurrence in Whitney,5 4 which have since carried the day, has been crucially important in
charting the direction in which our society has moved. But today, as
Archibald Cox put it:
[T]he political theory whith acknowledges the duty of government
to provide jobs, social security, medical care, and housing extends
to the field of human rights and imposes an obligation to promote
liberty, equality, and dignity. For a decade and a half recognition
of this duty [of the Court] has been the most creative force in constitutional law.55
48 Id.

49
50
51
52

Id. at 26.
Stone, 'The Common Law in the United States, 50 HARV. L. Rav. 4, 25 (1936).
C. BLACK, supra note 26, at 107.
See A. BEra, supra note 7.

53

Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 471 (1928) (dissenting opinion).

54 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372 (1927) (6oncurring opinion).

55 Cox, supra note 22, at 93.
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The more traditional rationales of judicial review do not quite fit
when the Court's role is so utterly different. Yet the specter of the Court
ruling the people persists and is, if anything, even more ominous where
the Court is telling the government what it must do, not simply what
it cannot do. What, then, is the Court's legitimate role in delineating
constitutional duties? Again, the legitimacy of the Court's decrees must
be derived from the community itself. Just as society may not be true
to its enduring principles, so may it not be fully aware of its emerging
ones. And just as the Court should maintain the one set of principles,
so should it support and encourage the adoption of others.
,
The law need not, as Learned Hand suggested, "be content to lag
behind the best inspiration of its time until it feels behind it the
weight of such general acceptance as will give sanction to its pretension
to unquestioned dictation." 56 Rather, the Court must foster the best inspiration of the time and help it win general acceptance.
Nevertheless, inspiration is "best," not simply because the individual Justices think so, but because it accords with the ideals of the community itself. Today the most important of those ideals is political
equality, and the Warren Court is correct in perceiving it as the dominant theme of American political development. The accuracy of this
perception gives the Court's equal protection pronouncements their
57
legitimacy.
It was the inaccuracy of the old Court's perception of community
ideals that made its performance so bad. For what the Nine Old Men
tried to put beyond the reach of government, both state and federal,
was "the momentous issue of the welfare state itself" 58 -an issue so political that it cannot and should not be determined by a court.5 9 It is
certainly not an issue about which there is a consensus in the community, moral or otherwise. It is in fact the issue around which politics in
this country has generally been divided. "Principles" bearing on the
issue, though fervently believed by those professing them, are utterly
conflicting. Unlike the ideal of political equality, they represent the
creeds of particular political parties, but are not the enduring principles of our society itself. The issue of the welfare state must, and will,
be "determined by 'dominant opinion' with or without judicial approval." 6° Yet this was just the issue which the old Court told the people they could not determine for themselves by trying to place the min56 L. HAND, supra note 33, at 15-16.
57 See Cox, supra note 22, at 98.
58 McCloskey, supra note 3, at 51.

59 Finkelstein, Judicial Self-Limitation, 37 HARv. L. REv. 338, 345 (1924).
60 McCloskey, supra note 3, at 51.
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imum wage, the federal income tax, and government price control beyond the majority's reach.
To some critics, the Warren Court's implementation of political
equality has also seemed a novel and illegitimate judicial theme."'
Equality, however, is not a novel ideal at all. 62 It is only that the range
of its required application is becoming broader and more evident as
the community becomes aware of the extent to which the world of the
poor and of the Negro differs from that in which the bulk of the public
lives. The apparent novelty of the Court's recent equal protection decisions stems "from the Court's partial recognition, reflecting a new
awareness on the part of the public, that the freedom embodied in constitutional guarantees as they have historically been limited is, for the
3
economically and socially disadvantaged, no freedom at all."6
In this context, and in the era of positive government, it is incumbent on the Court to protect unpopular minorities not simply from
governmental persecution, but from governmental neglect as well. For
just as there are certain groups in society that have proved politically
advantageous to oppress, so there are others whose interests are consistently bypassed by the political process in the rush toward the great society. This explains the necessity for affirmative decrees.
Because the Warren Court, unlike the old Court, has affirmatively
applied the true principles and ideals of our community to protect those
whose interests go unprotected elsewhere, it has acted properly. An
examination of a few of its more significant decisions demonstrates my
point.
III

A Loox AT SoME CASES
A. The Desegregation Cases
In Brown v. Board of Education64 and its progeny, 65 the Court was
not applying an emerging but unrecognized moral principle; rather, it
61 See especially Kurland, supra note 1, at 144.
62 Kurland's charge of "novelty" is rebutted by Choper, supra note 33, at 29. Choper

thoroughly approves of the Warren Court's heightened concern for equality before the
law. "Contrary to the plaint of hostile critics, I suggest that the Court's recent turn to
egalitarianism is a salutary movement, quite properly fulfilling its role in a democratic
society." My own analysis of the Court's role draws on Choper's article.
63 Deutsch, supra note 12, at 226.
64 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
65 E.g., Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U.S. 61 (1963) (courtroom seating); State Athl.
Comm'n v. Dorsey, 359 U.S. 533 (1959) (statute prohibiting integrated athletic competition); Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (segregation on buses); Holmes v. City of
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was enforcing a promise that the nation had made to the Negro in 1868
and had broken nine years later in the Compromise of 1877. Reconstruction had not proved good for business, and when the disputed
presidential election put the Northern Republicans to the choice between their humane and their economic ideals, they chose the latter.
"[They] abandoned the Negro to protect the tariff, 'hard' national
money, the national banking system, and lush business subsidies."' 66
This sell-out of the Negro was constitutionalized by the Fuller Court in
8 "Just as
the Civil Rights Cases67 and Plessy v. Perguson.6
the Settlement saved the South from political reconstruction, these decisions
saved it from cohstitutional reconstruction, ' ' 69 Thus, the "separate but
equal" doctrine of Plessy, not the desegregation commanded by Brown,
was the legislative, unprincipled, non-judicial judgment. Furthermore,
the "separate but equal" compromise standard imposed by Plessy was
an unadministrable, almost meaningless one. The Southern states never
lived up to it, and the courts never effectively enforced it.
In the almost sixty years between Plessy and Brown the gap between our ideal of racial equality and our racial practices had widened
even more. At the time Brown was decided, there was no reason to
think Southern legislatures would ever act to narrow the gap. In fact,
the Negro was not even a participant in the processes of the Southern
states. Nor had the national Congress proved receptive to Negro claims.
Despite the express authorization for federal legislation in section 5 of
the fourteenth amendment, Congress had not worried about Negro
rights for almost seventy-five years. There was little prospect that it was
about to become concerned once again. And, of course, it did not until
Brown awakened the nation's conscience.
It was, then, right and proper that the Court acted in Brown to
treat our "sweating national shame." 70 The decision made the nation
face up to its commitments to the Negro which it had found convenient to ignore. There seems no question that but for Brown, legislative
response would have been a long time coming.
Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955) (municipal golf courses); Mayor of Baltimore v. Dawson,
350 U.S. 877 (1955) (outlawing segregation in public beaches and bathhouses); Muir v.
Louisville Park Theatrical Ass'n, 847 U.S. 971 (1954) (city lease of park facilities).
66 Mendelson, The Politics of JUdicial Supremacy, 4 LAw & ECON. J. 175, 179 (1961).
See also V. DESANTIS, R.EPUBLICANS FACE THE SOUTHERN QUESTION 47-51 (1959); C. WOODWARD, REUNION AND REACTION 12-13 (1956):
67 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
68 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
69 Mendelsot, supra note 66, at 180.
70 Black, The Supreine Court 1966 Term, Fordword!"State Action," Equal Protectios
and California'sPrbposition 14, 81 HARV. L. Rtv. 69 (1967).
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Indeed, even the Court's critics applaud the Brown decision. Only
Professor Wechsler, who thoroughly approves its result,7 1 is troubled by
it.72 He does not think that a rationale for Brown can be worked out
which meets his demand for "neutral principles," a standard of constitutional adjudication he would require in every case. 73
Although, as Wechsler concedes, the concept of neutral principles
is an illusive and enigmatic one, 74 his disquietude with Brown, and
with the white primary7 5 and restrictive covenant 6 cases, seems to be
that the claims of Negroes have been singled out for special, kindly
treatment. He feels that if comparable claims had been made by members of other groups, the Court would not have vindicated them. Thus,
because Negroes receive special treatment, the decisions do not express
neutral principles. 77
Special protection of Negroes' rights, however, is not necessarily a
breach of neutrality. So long as the Court would have aided any group
comparably situated in our society it acts with the requisite neutrality.
Just because no other group, given the appalling history of slavery,
black codes and compelled segregation, may in fact be comparably situated does not alter the neutrality. Indeed, the three constitutional
amendments required to give the Negro equal legal rights attest to the
fact that no other group is comparably situated.
In other words, so long as the Court acts to protect any group
whose legitimate interests are consistently and shamefully neglected by
the political processes, it acts neutrally. The Court, then, protects Negroes not simply because they are Negroes, or because the Justices think
them especially worthy people, but because their legitimate interests
continue to go unprotected elsewhere.
By the same principle, I submit that compensatory legislation favoring Negroes would not be unconstitutional even though it made
71 Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARv, L. REv. 1
(1959). These cases, Wechsler feels, "have the best chance of making an enduring contribution to the quality of our society of any that I know in recent years." Id. at 27.
72 Id. at 31-34. For discussions of Professor Wechsler's article, see Deutsch, supra
note 12, at 178-98; Golding, Principled Decision-Making alid the Supreme Court, 63
CoLuM. L. REv. 35 (1963); Miller & Howell, The Myth of Neutrality in Constitutional
Adjudication, 27 U. CHI. L. REv. 661 (1960); Mueller & Schwartz, The Principle of Neutral
Principles, 7 U.C,L.AL. REv. 571 (1960); Pollak, Racial Discrimination and Judiciary
Integrity: A Reply to Professor Wechsler, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1959); Brown, Book
Review, 62 COLUM. L. RFv. 386 (1962).
73 See Wechsler, supra note 71.
74 Id.

75 Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
76 Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
77 Wechsler, supra note 71, at 27-34.
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racial classifications and even though similar legislation favoring whites
would violate equal protection.78 As the Supreme Court has taught us,
in the racial area "equal protection" does not involve simply the rationality of classifications, for even the illicit segregation statutes had conceivable rational bases, such as minimizing tension in the schools.
Rather, the function of equal protection here is to shield groups or individuals from stigmatization by government. Whether or not particular legislation stigmatizes is largely a sociological question requiring
consideration of the structure and history of our society as well as examination of the statute itself. Legislation favoring Negroes, then,
would be constitutional because it is rational and because in our society
it would not stigmatize whites. On the other hand, even if the "equal
ity" demanded by the separate but equal doctrine had been lived up to,
the doctrine itself, imposed by a white society, unconstitutionally stigmatizes Negroes in that society. Similarly, the miscegenation statutes,
even though "neutral" on their faces, forbidding whites as well as Negroes from interracial marriage or cohabitation, unconstitutionally stigmatize Negroes in the same way.79 This is largely what equal protection, at least in the area of racial classifications, is all about. It requires
judicial vindication, for the legislature can hardly be expected to protect the rights of those it seeks to vilify.
B. The Reapportionment Cases
In 1962 the Court overruled Colegrove v. Green,80 and held in
Baker v. Carr"'that a justiciable claim was stated in a complaint asserting that the inequality in voting districts, caused by the failure of the
Tennessee Legislature to reapportion by population, resulted in a denial of plaintiffs' fourteenth amendment rights. The Court, however,
did not indicate what the constitutional standards of apportionment
were to be. In fact, it held that the justiciable issue was the determination whether "a discrimination reflects no policy, but simply arbitrary
and capricious action."' 8 2 It seemed, therefore, as though a state legislative apportionment scheme had only to meet the test of minimum
rationality-that is, that the differentiation among voters had to reflect
an intelligible policy consistently applied.
Perhaps at the time of Baker the Court did not know precisely
78 But see Bittker, The Case of the Checkerboard Ordinance:An Experiment in Race
Relations, 71 YALE LJ. 1387 (1962).
79 See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
SO 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
81 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
82 Id. at 226.
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where it was going, but its decisions in Gray v. Sandersm in 1963 and
Wesberry v. Sanders4 in early 1964 gave some indication of its direction. When it decided Reynolds v. Sims8 5 and its companion cases"8
later in 1964, it was clear that the Court had arrived-not at a standard
of minimum rationality, but at that of "one man-one vote-one
value."87 This, the Court held, was the constitutional standard required
by the equal protection clause for both houses of a bicameral state
legislature.
Concededly, the "immediate preoccupation" of those who produced the mandate of equal protection was not the malapportionment
of state legislatures, but the relevant constitutional language of equal
protection. Such language "deals not only with racial discrimination,
but also with discrimination not based on color.""8 Like the Framers of
the Constitution, the draftsmen of the fourteenth amendment chose
"language capable of growth"8' 9 in order to "permit reasonable future
advances." 0 Consequently
it was open to the Court, in the "tradition of a broadly worded organic law ...

necessarily intended for permanence," to treat the

matter of legislative apportionment within the confines of the
equal protection clause. 91
What is interesting about the decisions for our purposes is not the
propriety of "one man-one vote," but that the Court was again aiding
a group that was unable to achieve effective legislative recourse. Although in the Reapportionment Cases the Court was seeking to protect
the rights of urban majorities rather than those of minorities, these urban groups were not political majorities with respect to the issue of apportionment because of the malapportionment itself.
83 372 U.S. 368 (1963).
84 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
85 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
86 See WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 377 U.S. 633 (1964); Maryland Comm. for Fair
Representation v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656 (1964); Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678 (1964); Roman
v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695 (1964); Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen'l Ass'y, 377 U.S. 713 (1964).
87 For an excellent discussion and defense of the "one man--one vote" principle, see
Auerbach, The Reapportionment Cases: One Person, One Vote-One Vote, One Value,
1964 Sup. CT. REv. 1. See also McCloskey, The Supreme Court 1961 Term, Foreword: The
Reapportionment Case, 76 HARv. L. REv. 54 (1962). For criticism of the Court's work in
this area, see Kurland, supra note 1, at 149-57; Neal, Baker v. Carr: Politics in Search of
Law, 1962 Sup. CT. REv. 252.
88 Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HAv. L.
REv. 1, 60 (1955).
89 Id. at 62-63.
90 Id. at 61.
91 Choper, supra note 33, at 30 (footnotes omitted).
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For change, compulsion was required. There was little likelihood
that the representatives from the malapportioned districts would Voluntarily redraw the boundary lines of the very districts kind enough to
put them in office. And though Congress doubtless could have acted
pursuant to section 5 of the fourteenth amendment, there was no prospect that it would. After all, the representatives in the Houe itself
were put there by malapportioned congressional districts. Consequently, where no referendum procedure existed, the majority was
utterly powerless against the entrenched rural minority.9 2 As with
Brown, it was only the Court that could effectively remedy the situation.
Although the reapportionment decisions have met with widespread popular approval, the judicial restrainers have not treated them
kindly. Mr. Justice Harlan, dissenting, termed them "an experiment
in venturesome constitutionalism." 93 Professor Kurland refers to their
"unbending simplicity" 94 and Professor Freund calls their governing
principle simplistic.9 5 In 1963 Professor Bickel doubted that Baker v.
Carr was likely "to play a substantial and enduring role in shaping
our society." 96

However, as Professor Auerbach has pointed out, it is
paradoxical for the advocates of judicial self-limitation to criticize
the Court for helping to make majority rule effective, because the
case for self-restraint rests on the assumption that the Court is reviewing the legislative acts of representatives who are put in office
and can be turned out of office by a majority of the people. Since
malapportionment destroys this assumption, judicial intervention
to remove this obstacle to majority rule may
be less intolerable
97
than the self-perpetuation of minority rule.

Of course it may also be paradoxical "for the judicial activists,
who extol the Court as the protector of minorities to praise it [here]
for helping to erase the power of minorities to curb majority rule in
our state legislatures."98 But even if it is desirable to require a consensus greater than that reflected by a simple majority before any
affirmative legislation action can be taken, such a decision should not
92 As the Court stated in Reynolds, "No effective political remedy to obtain relief
against the alleged malapportionment of the Alabama Legislature appears to have been
available." 377 U.S. 533, 553 (1964) (footnote omitted).
93 Id. at 625 (dissenting opinion).
94 Kurland, supra note 1, at 156,
95 Freund, supra note 2, at 638.
96 Bickel, Reapportionment and Liberal Myths, 35 COMMENTARTY 483 (1963).
97 Auerbach, supra note 87, at 2.
98 Id.
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be made by the legislators whose political fates may depend on that
decision. 9 Furthermore, there is no good reason to think that the
rural minority which gains power through malapportionment needs
such added protection. "Past experience gives us reason to think that
protection of minorities will expand as the electoral base of our representative institutions becomes broader aild more democratic,"' 100
Up to now few, if any, of our states have been governed by "transitory majorities representing the more populous districts."
.. [MI]alapportionment has often given a coalition of conservative
urban forces, farm groups, and small-town businessmen, the power
to frustrate state welfare efforts. 01
Indeed, malapportionment is undoubtedly one of the reasons why the
states have not lived up to their constitutional responsibilities to the
Negro and to the poor, 0 2
Finally, it is not inappropriate that the guarantor of democracy
in state government is itself a federal institution. For it was to counter
the threat of factional domination of state legislatures that the Federalists wrote into the Constitution the command of article IV, section
4: "The United States shall guarantee to every state in this Union a
Republican form of Government." They intended this clause to grant
the federal government the power to restore republicanism, or what
we now would refer to as representative democracy. 03 Even if the guarantee clause does not state a justiciable standard,' 4 it does establish a
model of federalism which contemplates the federal government safeguarding the democratic processes in the states. 0 5
C. Other Voting Cases
The Reapportionment Cases are not the only ones where state
limitations on the right to vote have come under equal protection scru99 Id.

at 67.

100 Id. at 49 (footnote omitted). See also S. HOOK, THE PARADoXEs OF FREEDOM 66

(1962).
101 Auerbach, supra note 87, at 49-50 (footnote omitted).
102 See generally Willbern, The States as Components in an Areal Division of Powers,
in AREA AND POWER; A THEORY OF LocAL GOVERNMENT (A. Maass ed. 1959); CoMMIssION
ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR TRANSMIrrTAL TO THE

CONGRESS 39-40 (1955).
100 See THE FEDERALiST No. 10 (Madison); THE FEDERALisr No. 43 (Madison); see also
Diamond, The Federalist's View of Federalism, in ESSAYS IN FEDERALIsM 21 (Institute for
Studies in Federalism ed. 1961); THE FEDERALiST No. 39 (Madison).
104 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 227 (1962); Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 552
(1946). See Bonfield, The Guaranty Clause of Article IV, Section 4: A Study in Constitutional Desuetude, 46 MINN. L. REv. 513 (1962).
105 See Note, Theories of Federalism and Civil Rights, 75 YALE L.J. 1007, 1023-24
(1964). See also Auerbach, supra note 87, at 84-87.
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tiny by the Warren Court. In Carringtonv. Rash'01 the Court held that
the state could not disenfranchise actual residents simply because they
resided pursuant to military assignment. And in Harper v. Virginia
Board of Elections'0 7 the Court invalidated the long familiar state laws
making payment of the poll tax a prerequisite of voting. In so doing,
the Court applied an egalitarian principle of our community that
emerged long after the drafting of the clause under which the law
was struck down. For in 1868, when the fourteenth amendment was
enacted, property requirements as a condition for voting were widespread. 08 Nevertheless, as Mr. Justice Douglas told us in Harper, "In
determining what lines are unconstitutionally discriminatory we have
never been confined to historic notions of equality .... Notions of

what constitutes equal treatment for purposes of the Equal Protection
Clause do change."'1 9 That the Court was correct in its assessment of
our emergent principle of absolute equality between rich and poor
with respect to the franchise seems abundantly clear. In fact in section
10 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965,110 Congress had declared its view
that the poll tax was unconstitutional.
Again those hit hardest by the laws struck down in Carrington
and Harper-those, in other words, disenfranchised by them-could
obviously not seek recourse through the legislative processes in which
they were not permitted to participate. And legislators elected without
their participation were not likely to worry greatly about their interests
or be anxious to extend the franchise to them. In Carrington and
Harper, then, as in the Reapportionment Cases, it was up to the undemocratic Court to promote our democratic values.
D. The Criminal Procedure Cases
In the area of criminal procedure, as with race relations, an appalling gap has existed between our principles and our practices. For
while the constitutional provisions safeguarding the accused have
proved politically viable as slogans in Fourth of July oratory, their
effective implementation apparently has not. In this area also the Supreme Court has acted to compel the community to live up to its pro106 380 U.S. 89 (1965). The case is discussed in Van Alstyne, The Fourteenth Amendment, the "Right" to Vote, and the Understanding of the Thirty-Ninth Congress, 1965
Sup. CT. REv. 33.
107 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
108 In fact, the Supreme Court had twice before upheld state poll tax laws. Butler v.
Thompson, 341 U.S. 937 (1951); Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277 (1937).
109 383 U.S. at 669 (emphasis in original).
110 42 U.S.C. § 1973(h)(a) (Supp. I, 1965).
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fessed ideals. And once again those whom the Court has sought to
protect are politically impotent.
Criminal defendants as such are not likely to be a popular group.
And since those most subject to arrest and to the abuses of the criminal
process are the poor, the Negro, and the poor Negro, even less legislative
concern is to be expected. Their plight at the hands of the police is
not likely to inspire legislative empathy,"" and their rights, constitutional and otherwise, will almost surely go unprotected without judicial
intervention. The political voice of the urban poor has not been a loud
one until very recently, and malapportionment has further muffled its
effectiveness in state legislatures. Especially since assurance of the indigent defendant's constitutional rights would require the state legislatures to appropriate money, the probability of continuing political
stagnation was even greater.
Again the egalitarian ideal informed much of the Court's work in
this area. Griffin v. Illinois held that a state violates equal protection
by refusing to furnish a transcript of the trial to any indigent accused
who alleges serious errors on appeal. 112 Gideon v. Wainwright required
the states to supply trial counsel at public expense to paupers accused
of felonies. 1 3 Douglas v. California extended the Gideon holding to
paupers appealing to the initial court of review." 4 In the criminal
process, then, as with the franchise, it has become unconstitutional to
draw any lines between rich and poor. In the area where the ultimate
coercive power of the state is brought to bear on the individual, such
absolute equality is both constitutionally appropriate and required by
our professed ideals. To realize this ideal fully, it may be necessary in
11 Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942), is perhaps illustrative of this point. At
issue there was a statute which authorized involuntary sterilization for those convicted of
three felonies involving moral turpitude. But exempted from the statute's coverage were
"offenses arising out of the violation of the prohibitory laws, revenue acts, embezzlement,
or political offenses .... " Could it be that the legislators could conceive of themselves,
their families and their friends as potential violators of the exempted laws but not of
those criminal laws much more likely to bear on the poor such as assault or robbery?
The Court struck down the Oklahoma sterilization law as violative of equal protection
because the lines it drew were found to be "artificial." But if the Court had not been
dealing with "legislation which [involved] one of the basic civil rights of man"--the right
to procreate-such artificial line-drawing would probably have been sustained. See discussion of Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949), at p. 26, infra.
Perhaps Skinners equal protection ground of decision was simply a way of avoiding the
substantive due process (or cruel and unusual punishment) question which lurked in the
background, i.e., is involuntary sterilization even constitutional? But see Choper, supra
note 33, at 33.
112 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
113 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
114 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
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future decisions to require thp states to provide "equality" for the poor
with respect to bail and the facilities for investigation.
That the Court should take the lead is not surprising. The preservation of the integrity of the judicial process, unlike reapportionment, is a task for which the judiciary has a special competence and a
special responsibility. It is only by seeing the criminal process as it
functions in actual cases that the areas where constitutional rights are
threatened, and the remedies required to vindicate them, become
evident.
In addition, in the area of criminal procedure the interest of
federalism per se-that is, the interest in the states as laboratories for
social experimentation-has never seemed a particularly keen one.
Furthermore, when the Court has decreed uniform protection for
specific constitutional rights, the method of their protection has remained largely a matter of state concern. After Gideon, for instance, it
remains the prerogative of the state legislatures to install either a
public defender system or one of appointed counsel from the bar
as a whole. In Miranda,115 though the Court virtually promulgated a
prearraignment code, it expressly invited legislative response and state
formulation of alternative schemes that would provide equally adequate safeguards for the fifth amendment rights at stake." 6
Perhaps under the prod of prior Supreme Court cases, many of the
states had already adopted the various reforms which the Court subsequently decreed for the nation as a whole. In fact, at the time of
Gideon only five states did not provide trial counsel for the indigent
accused of a felony. 1 7 Even within the states, however, the needed
reforms were frequently initiated by the state courts rather than the
legislature." 8 Moreover, those states which had not acted before the
Supreme Court's declarations were not likely to do so in the near
future. For although Wolf v. Colorado held in 1949 that the federal
fourth amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures applied to the states, 119 Mapp v. Ohio did not apply the federal
exclusionary rule to the states until 1961, twelve years later 20 In Wolf
115 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
116 Id. at 490.
117 Israel, Gideon v. Wainwright: The "Art" of Overruling, 1963 SuP. CT. RFv. 211,
212 n.7.
118 See, e.g.. People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955).
119 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
120 367 U.S. 643 (1961). See Allen, Federalism and the Fourth Amendment: Requiem
for Wolf, 1961 Sup. CT.REv. 1, for an excellent discussion of Wolf and Mapp and events
taking place in the interval between them.
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the Court had left the newly declared federal right 6f privacy "to the
tender mercies of the states for its enforcement,"12 1 although in the
federal system it had been recognized as early as 1914, in Weeks v.
United States,

22

that only the exclusionary rule provided a constitu-

tionally adequate safeguard for the protection of that right, Any state
that did not realize this by 1961 probably simply did not want to, and
never would.
In the criminal law area, the Court has faithfully discharged
its reviewing responsibilities. It has decreed equality between rich and
poor in an area where the community's principles required it, but where
the legislatures had not translated these principles into practice. At the
same time it has, where practical, left room for both legislative initiative and legislative response.
CONCLUSION

"Once loosed, the idea of Equality is not easily cabined."' 23 Nevertheless, the Court's equal protection decisions have avoided the twin
dangers posed by the judicial implementation of the egalitarian ideal.
First, the Court has recognized that our egalitarianism is not, and is not
likely to become, one of maximum materialequality among people. We
still believe in material rewards for individual accomplishment. It is
only, therefore, in certain limited areas that equality between rich and
poor is a moral principle of our society. Where such equality is a part
of our ideals, however, the Court is right to decree its realization even
if the political branches have been unwilling to pay for its implementation. The Court was correct in singling out the criminal process and
the franchise for such treatment, since in these areas the relationship
of the individual to his government should not depend on the ability
to pay.
A second danger which the Court must continue to avoid is the
choking of the political process with the equal protection clause. For
almost all legislation is advantageous to some groups and disadvantageous to others, and often in a somewhat arbitrary way. Nevertheless,
this sort of give and take within the political process, particularly where
economic regulation is challenged, should not become the concern of
the Court. 124 Unlike the old Court, the current Court has specifically
eschewed responsibility in this atea.
121 Allen, supra note 120, at 5.

122 232 U.S. 383 (1914),
123 Cox, .tpra note 22, at 91.
124 See A. BIC=E, supra note 24, at 221-28.
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Railway Express Agency v. New York is illustrative. 12 5 Railway
Express challenged a New York City traffic ordinance forbidding advertising on the sides of trucks, the theory being that it distracted
drivers of other vehicles. Those trucks whose advertisements were connected with the owner's business, however, were exempted from the
ordinance. Railway Express, which sold advertising space on its delivery
trucks, argued that simply because one is touting one's own product
does not make his sign any the less a distraction to other drivers. Railway Express of course was right. The statute did draw an arbitrary,
unreasonable distinction. Mr. Justice Douglas, however, was also right
in rejecting the argument, saying, "It is no requirement of equal protection that all evils of the same genus be eradicated or none at all."'12 6
One can confidently surmise that in the New York City council the
small business interests were sufficiently powerful to block the regulation altogether unless they were granted exemption from it. Granted,
they won special "irrational" dispensation. But surely the legislation
did not discriminate against Railway Express. Interpreted otherwise,
equal protection could become as debilitating to welfare legislation
as the ill-fated doctrine of substantive due process once was.
The Court must continue carefully to distinguish those groups
whose rights are consistently trammelled and whose interests are consistently neglected in the political arena, from those groups whose interests are occasionally submerged in legislative compromise. This the
Court has done. It has applied and extended the principles and ideals
of our society to those "insular" minorities12 7 which, either because they
are unpopular or because the vindication of their rights is expensive,
are persecuted or neglected by the legislatures. In so doing, it has tried
to secure the integrity of the legislative processes themselves. These are
tasks for which the courts, the "deviant" institutions in our democratic
128
society, are required.
125 336 U.S. 106 (1949).
126 Id. at 110.
127 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938). See also

Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 238 (1940).
128 By contrast, the old Court was in large measure protecting states' rights, not
individual rights. For the argument underlying the Court's Child Labor Case, Hammer
v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918), and its progeny (e.g., Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co.,
259 U.S. 20 (1922); Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44 (1922); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1
(1936)), was that the tenth amendment's reservation of powers to the states constituted an
independent restriction on otherwise constitutional acts of the federal government. Yet
the Court's use of substantive due process had already emasculated the states' power to
deal with these social and economic problems. See cases cited in note 4 supra. Rather
than fill a legislative vacuum, the Nine Old Men decreed one. And they did so in an area
where Congress should have been left a free hand.
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In three 1966 cases 129 interpreting Congress's powers to enforce
equal protection pursuant to section 5 of the fourteenth amendment,
the Supreme Court has given Congress almost free rein where the
Fuller Court had curtailed it in the Civil Rights Cases.130 As Professor
Cox has said, "If the Congress follows the lead that the Court has provided, [these cases] ...

will prove as important in bespeaking national

legislative authority to promote human rights as the Labor Board decisions of 1937 were in providing national authority to regulate the economy."''1 1 Congressional action, however, is a big "if." For as Cox also
warns, "the need for judicial action is strongest in the areas of the

law where political processes prove inadequate, not from lack of legisTo begin with, the Court's interpretation of the tenth amendment was simply wrong.

Before M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), a plausible argument could
have been made that that amendment did prevent the implied expansion of federal
power pursuant to the necessary and proper clause. But M'Culloch decided in 1819 that
it did not prevent such an expansion of power. Then, 100 years later, in the Child Labor
Case, the Court adopted the implausible position that the reserved powers of the states
comprise an independent restriction on otherwise dearly constitutional acts of the federal
government. As has been conclusively demonstrated, the tenth amendment was declaratory
of the division of powers between state and nation and "was not intended as a yardstick, or
independent restriction of federal power." Cramton, The Supreme Court and the Decline
of State Power, 2 LAw 9- EcoN. J. 175, 186 (1959). As its sponsor, James Madison, put it in
1791: "Interference with the power of the States was no constitutional criterion of the
power of Congress. If the power was not given, Congress could not exercise it; if given,
they [sic] might exercise it, although it should interfere with the laws, or even the
Constitution[s] of the States." 2 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 1897 (1791). And in overruling the

Child Labor Case, the Court came back to this view when it said: "The [tenth] amendment ..states but a truism that all is retained which has not been surrendered." United
States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100,;124 (1941).
In addition to being wrong about the tenth amendment, the Court was wrong in so
vigorously protecting states' rights from the national government. Where states' (as opposed
to individual's) rights are at issue,
the justification for judicial review . . . . for the final constitutional word
to be spoken by a "deviant institution" in a democracy, is weak. The states, whose
constitutional rights are allegedly being assaulted, are well represented in the
councils of national government (especially the Congress) and are in a peculiarly
strong position to protect themselves against national encroachment. Here, the
political process may generally be depended upon to produce a fair judgment.
If a majority of the states' representatives (... [the] members of Congress) determine that federal power has not been exceeded, then the Court should overturn
the decision, if at all, only if it is so clearly in error as not to be "open to
rational question."
Choper, supra note 33, at 39-40 (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted).
129 Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383
U.S. 301 (1966); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966). See generally Cox, supra note
22.
130 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
131 Cox, supra note 22, at 91.
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2
lative power but because the problem is neglected by politicians.'1 if
the legislatures continue to neglect their constitutional responsibilities,
we can only hope the Court will continue to do the best it can to
fill the gap.

132 Id. at

i22.

